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You have found the Ulanowicz et al. paper
inconsistent, misleading and terminologi-
cally incorrect. This is very bad, I agree.
S. Petrovskii, Ecol. Compl. Editor-in-Chief
1 Introduction
In the course of our own research on theoretical concepts for ecology, inspired by computing and infor-
mation science, we have discovered the recent1 article “Quantifying sustainability: Resilience, efficiency
and the return of information theory” (Ulanowicz et al., 2009). It has been a sincere pleasure to discover
that renowned ecologists keep advocating the use of information theory for the description and assess-
ment of ecosystems. It has been a severe disappointment, however, that information theory is far from
being portrayed in the best possible light in the article in question—the formulation and use of basic IT
concepts are unnecessarily obscure, deliberately incompatible with standard terminology, and in places
just mathematically wrong.
We shall endeavor to lift some of the confusion by correcting errors, dissecting ambiguities and using
standard terminology wherever possible. We believe that clear and rigorous presentations are necessary
in order to enable information theoreticians and ecologists to engage in a fruitful dialogue. Only very
basic concepts of IT are required to follow our arguments. The interested reader is referred to the
textbook of MacKay, 2003, an excellent and encyclopaedic treatise that is freely accessible online.
This critique should not be understood as extending to the content of the criticized article; it adresses
its formal presentation only. To the contrary, our disappointment arises mainly from fear that the article
might influence readers rather against than in favour of application of IT in ecology, because of the vague
air of inconsistency owing to the many terminological and mathematical issues we are about to discuss.
2 Terms
2.1 Surprisal and Shannon Information Content
What Ulanowicz et al. call “Boltzmann’s famous definition of surprisal”, s = −k log p, is nowadays known
in IT as the Shannon information content of an event. While Boltzmann preceded Shannon by some 80
years, it was the latter who generalized the idea, brilliant as it may have been, into a full-fledged theory.
The scalar constant k is not explicit in the modern definition; rather, it is implicit in the dimensionless
unit implied by the choice of base of the logarithm; cf. section 3.5 below. The particular constant kB
that nowadays bears Boltzmann’s name is for the particular case of thermodynamic entropy, and carries
the dimension of a heat capacity. Shannon argues that, in IT, no single appropriate value exists, and
the constant “merely amounts to a choice of a unit of measure” (Shannon, 1948), in the sense that it is
the only degree of freedom in an axiomatic specification of the entropy function, see below.
It is ironic that Ulanowicz et al. elaborate on the sign of the expression,
“Because the probability, p, is normalized to a fraction between zero and one, most offhandedly
conclude that the negative sign is a mathematical convenience to make s work out positive
1At the time of writing, 2012.
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(and that may have been Boltzmann’s motivation). But from the perspective of logic one
can only read this equation as defining s to gauge what p is not.” [Emphasis added]
seeing that the form inscribed on Boltzmann’s tombstone, S = k logW , has a positive sign instead. Con-
fer also the notation of MacKay, 2003, where the likewise positive form log2(1/P (x)) is used. Reciprocal
pairs of quantities abound in science, for instance consider “period” and “frequency”, or “resistance” and
“conductance”. Which of each pair is about what is and what is not, respectively, depends very much on
the frame of reference.
2.2 Aggregate Indeterminacy and Entropy
What Ulanowicz et al. call the “aggregate systems indeterminacy”, defined in their equation (3) up to
a missing equality sign (a simple typographic error that may subtly confuse the reader nevertheless), is
nowadays usually called the Shannon entropy of a random variable whose possible outcomes are specified
by the events i and respective probabilities pi.
H = −
∑
i
pi log pi
Because all of the following definitions involve more than one random variable, it greatly adds to clarity
to mention them explicitly:
H(Y ) = −
∑
i
P (Y = i) logP (Y = i)
We shall use only the symbols Y and Z for random variables, because X is reserved in the notation of
Ulanowicz et al., 2009.
2.3 Average Mutual Constraint and Mutual Information
What Ulanowicz et al. call the “average mutual constraint” (without saying precisely between what,
see sections 3.1 and 3.3), defined in their equation (5), is usually called the mutual information or
transinformation between two random variables.
I(Y, Z) =
∑
i,j
P (Y = i, Z = j) log
P (Y = i, Z = j)
P (Y = i)P (Z = j)
Note that the explanations leading to equation (5) are problematic in various ways, see sections 3.1
to 3.3.
2.4 Conditional Entropy
What Ulanowicz et al. call the “conditional entropy” Ψ is not what is usually called a conditional entropy.
A typical definition of conditional entropy, or quivocation, of Y given Z would look like:
H(Y | Z) =
∑
i,j
P (Y = i, Z = j) log
P (Z = j)
P (Y = i, Z = j)
It plays an important role in the decomposition of uncertainties in IT, such as in the so-called chain rule:
H(Y, Z) = H(Y | Z) +H(Z)
The definition of Ulanowicz et al.’s equation (7) can be retrieved by adding the conditional entropies of
Y given Z and vice versa:
H(Y | Z) +H(Z | Y ) =
∑
i,j
P (Y = i, Z = j) log
P (Z = j)
P (Y = i, Z = j)
+
∑
i,j
P (Y = i, Z = j) log
P (Y = i)
P (Y = i, Z = j)
=
∑
i,j
P (Y = i, Z = j) log
P (Y = i)P (Z = j)
P (Y = i, Z = j)2
This sum is sometimes called the variation of information between Y and Z. It is easy to see that
it satisfies the axioms of a metric and may hence serve as an information-theoretic measure of distance
between random variables.
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3 Ambiguities and Errors
3.1 Events and Random Variables
In equation (3), Ulanowicz et al. give the (slightly broken) definition of the Shannon entropy of a single
random variable. Immediately afterwards, they move on to the more complex topic of a pair of random
variables, but without explicitly saying so. The transition is implied in the statement:
“Accordingly, we will define pij as the joint probability that events i and j co-occur.”
The failure to explicitly identify the two random variables, only distinguished by the fact that their
outcomes are indexed with variables i and j, respectively, causes confusion even with the authors them-
selves: They apparently fail to realize that what they call the conditional entropy is in fact the sum of
two conditional entropies, namely of each random variable conditional on the other. Consequently, the
interesting question whether the two should be lumped together or examined separately is not addressed:
For instance, calculation of conditional entropies of Y (origin of flow) given Z (destination of flow) and
vice versa for the networks depicted in Ulanowicz et al.’s Figs. 1 and 3 are strongly asymmetric, with
ratios of 1 : 6 and 1 : 8.6, respectively. We do not have an ecological rationale why this should be
meaningful, but we feel that a distinction that arises naturally from standard terminology should not be
obscured deliberately, unless it has been proven irrelevant.
The same source of imprecision might also have contributed to the problem discussed in the next
subsection.
3.2 Joint Indeterminacy and Independency
In their explanation of “average mutual constraint” (mutual information), between their two equations
both numbered (4), Ulanowicz et al. state:
“Here the assumption is made that the indeterminacy sij [= −k log(pij)] is maximal when i
and j are totally independent. We call that maximum s∗ij .”
The assumption does not hold, and there is no such maximum: For independent events, we have pij =
pi.p.j , but joint probabilities can of course be smaller than that value. In particular, sij = +∞ for
mutually exclusive events.
Stating that sij is bounded above by s
∗
ij is equivalent to stating that pij is bounded below by pi.p.j .
We can only conjecture that this (false) assumption is made in order to ensure that mutual information
is nonnegative. Fortunately, the assumption is not needed: Individual terms log(pij/pi.p.j) in equation
(5) may well be negative, but their weighted sum, the mutual information, is nonnegative by Gibbs’
inequality; see also section 3.4.
3.3 Symmetry of Mutual Information
Ulanowicz et al. claim that their second equation (4) is symmetric, written as xi|j = · · · = xj|i. Note
that this is not symmetry in the usual algebraic sense, namely that the indices i and j may simply be
exchanged. If one does so naïvely, the denominator of the argument to the logarithm becomes pj.p.i which
is very different from pi.p.j. On the other hand, if one remembers that i and j are events concerning
two different random variables Y and Z, respectively, then the symmetry becomes obvious, as both
P (Y = i, Z = j) = P (Z = j, Y = i) and P (Y = i)P (Z = j) = P (Z = j)P (Y = i) hold trivially. Hence
it follows that I(Y, Z) = I(Z, Y ); see section 2.3 above.
3.4 The role of the Logarithm
Much has been said about the role of the logarithm in the formulae of IT. Ulanowicz et al. promise in
their footnote 1:
“Here the reader might ask why the lack of i is not represented more directly by (1 − pi)?
The advantage and necessity of using the logarithm will become apparent presently.”
But only a very brief rationale can be found in the following discussion, qualifying hardly as advantageous,
and certainly not as necessary: In the statement leading to their equation (6) it is claimed (correctly)
that the convexity of the logarithm ensures that joint entropy decomposes into mutual information and
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conditional entropies, all non-negative. But that would be true for any other convex function. Shannon,
1948 has the definitive answer to the riddle: Any function satisfying a small number of properties
characteristic of a measure of uncertainty (namely continuity, monotonicity in the number of outcomes
of uniform distributions, and additive compositionality of choice) is necessarily equivalent to Shannon
entropy, up to a conversion of units.
Instead of actually working with logarithms, Ulanowicz et al. promptly revert to non-logarithmic
scales in their section 5, in the introduction to the concept of “window of vitality”. There they cite previous
work (Zorach and Ulanowicz, 2003), where the measures are developed in entirely non-logarithmic form.
For additional serious problems with the concerned paragraphs, see section 3.6 below.
3.5 Logarithmic Units
In the argument leading towards their definitions of “ascendency” and “reserve”, after equation (10),
Ulanowicz et al. state:
“The dimensions in the definitions (10) remain problematic, however. All of the ratios that
occur there are dimensionless (as required of probabilities), so that the only dimensions that
the variablesH , X and Ψ carry are those of the base of the logarithm used in their calculation.
For example, if the base of the logarithm is 2, the variables are all measured in bits.”
In this statement, the concepts of unit and dimension are confused. A unit conveys two independent
aspects of meaning: dimension and magnitude. For example, the SI unit 1m has the dimension length
and a magnitude in relation to other units of length that makes it equivalent to, say, 39.37 in. The
units of information, just like other logarithmic quantities, are dimensionless units, but they do have a
magnitude. For example, 1 bit is equivalent to 1/8 byte, about 1.44 nat or 3.01 dB. If we take the last
sentence of the above quotation as implying that the base of the logarithm is not fixed once and for all,
then the magnitude of the unit of IT measures carries essential meaning.
In the immediately following section 4, “A two-tendency world”, Ulanowicz et al. give concrete numbers
for material flows in an ecosystem and purport to multiply IT measures with total flow:
“T.. for this system is 102.6mgCm
−2 y−1; the ascendency, A, works out to 53.9mgCbitsm−2 y−1
and the reserve, Φ, is 121.3 mgCbitsm−2 y−1.”
Have you noticed the difference in units between the first and the following figures? That they are
given in one sentence creates the dangerously false impression that the absolute values can be compared
as “apples with apples” (Ulanowicz et al., 2009, section 7, “One-Eyed Ecology”). The practice is even
worse than ambiguous: the use of several decimal places and fully explicit dimensional units suggest an
absoluteness that is not warranted. The above figure for A could be given as either
• 53.9 mgCbitm−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units of base 2 chosen by the authors, or
• 37.7 mgCnatm−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units of base e used by Boltzmann, or
• 162.3 mgCdBm−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units of base 101/10 preferred by electric engineers, or
• 6.74 mgCbytem−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units of base 28 (such that 1 byte = 8 bit) preferred by
many computer scientists, or
• 9.88 pgCCDROMm−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units corresponding to the information content of
a standard (Red Book) Mode-1 CD-ROM of 666 000× 1024 byte, or
• 64.7 gC centm−2 y−1, in the logarithmic units of base 21/1200 preferred by musicians,
or in whatever logarithmic units another author might fancy.
Having ruled out the possibility to compare flows with flow–information products directly, and having
conceded that flow–information products only make sense when compared to each other in appropriately
adjusted units, one wonders why the IT measures have been multiplied with flows in the first place; all
of the arguments of their section 4 would have worked perfectly, and with less room for confusion, with
X and Ψ in place of A and Φ. See also the next subsection.
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3.6 Exponential Units in the Window of Vitality
Even the reader who has worked through the bookkeeping of dimensional and dimensionless units in
the section we have just discussed, must be baffled by the following statement Ulanowicz et al., 2009,
section 5, “The survival of the most robust”:
“Zorach and Ulanowicz (2003) [. . . ] plotted the networks, not on the axes A vs. Φ, but rather
on the transformed axes c = 2Φ/2 and n = 2A.
Certainly this cannot be correct, because here dimensional quantities appear in the exponents. Cross-
reading of the cited source (Zorach and Ulanowicz, 2003) reveals a definition of the symbol Φ equivalent to
the definition of the symbol Ψ by Ulanowicz et al., 2009. Although more difficult to verify, we conjecture
that A should be read as X accordingly. That is, after attaching physical dimensions to information
measures by multiplying them with flows, the authors silently revert to the dimensionless quantities, in
order to make exponential scaling meaningful.
What makes the comparison of information measures for different systems possible is exactly what is
criticized scornfully in their section 3:
“Unfortunately, bits do not convey any sense of the physical magnitude of the systems to
which they pertain. For example, a network of flows among the populations of microbes in
a Petri Dish could conceivably yield an H of the same order of magnitude as a network of
trophic exchanges among the mammalian species on the Serengeti Plain.”
This feature of IT, namely that it quantifies information content of observed choice (traditionally of
messages in communication) as intensive properties, regardless of the extent of systems that produce
them, is commonly regarded as one of its essential abstractions. Nor is this an uncommon practice
in science; certainly no one would object to the temperature of a Petri Dish being compared to the
temperature of the Serengeti Plain. Temperature as an example has not been chosen randomly; indeed
Boltzmann’s work on uncertainty has had its main application in thermodynamics.
4 Conclusion
Interdisciplinary research is partially motivated by the hope that innovative research can be sparked
by exposing experts of one field to the concepts of another. The article criticized here, though clearly
intended for the very purpose, is an illustrative example how not to do it. An overview article in a
journal is not the place to provide a sound and complete introduction to a theory, but it can and should
leave a non-expert reader both motivated and prepared to read up on the details in the literature of the
field.
We have identified two key issues that merit words of warning and recommendations to prospective
interdisciplinary researchers:
1. Ideosyncratic terminology. Renaming key concepts of theories in the process of translating them
to a different field leaves the reader unfit to look up the technical details in the relevant literature.
Theoreticians have a cause for celebration whenever they discover that concepts in disparate fields
are actually the same; actively propagating obfuscated terminology hinders theoretical progress
and may well cause the reinvention of several wheels.
2. Internal inconsistency. A reader who is not an expert on the subject may not fully grasp, or
explicitly doubt, the results of a mathematical discussion at first sight; scepticism is generally
a laudable trait for a scientist. However, there are numerous heuristics to judge whether the
arguments in question can possibly be valid: Mathematical digressions should be both true and
relevant, dimensions and units should match for all figures to be compared, all mathematical objects
involved in a definition should be named, etcetera. All maths, especially when given to demonstrate
the usefulness of a theory, should be prepared carefully enough to pass the test of heuristic reading
by a reasonably educated non-expert. On the other side, editors should feel encouraged to seek
reviews of interdisciplinary articles from experts in the respective other field. Thus, issues as the
ones we have pointed out above, and possibly less obvious ones also, could be remedied before
publication.
A description of an unfamiliar theory in terms that cannot be traced to their usage in the field, and
in formulae that obviously cannot be quite right, makes a tough reading. Who can blame the readers
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for concluding that the subject is not worth their attention? However, that conclusion could be severely
premature.
In the present case, we see no reason to doubt the validity or the utility of Ulanowicz et al.’s philo-
sophical observations and empirical findings. The proposal to investigate the potential (as opposed to
actual as in philosophy, not as opposed to kinetic as in physics) is certainly sound. We conjecture that
similar investigations would be worthwhile for other subdisciplines of what is nowadays subsumed under
computing and information science, for instance in modal, fuzzy and other nonclassical logics, or nonde-
terministic automata theory. Evidence of tentative import into ecology can be found in the logical study
of uncertainty (Regan, Colyvan, and Burgman, 2002), and in the use of Petri nets (not to be confused
with Petri dishes) for ecological modelling by Sharov, 1991, respectively. The latter is a fine case in point
of our critique, as an interdisciplinary application that is also quite up to the internal standards of the
Petri net community. We are looking forward to an ecological presentation of information measures of
comparable quality.
References
MacKay, David J.C. (2003). Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. url: http://www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/itprnn/book.pdf.
Regan, Helen M., Mark Colyvan, and Mark A. Burgman (2002). “A taxonomy and treatment of uncer-
tainty for ecology and conservation biology”. In: Ecological Applications 12.2, pp. 618–628.
Shannon, Claude E. (July 1948). “A Mathematical Theory of Communication”. In: Bell System Technical
Journal 27, pp. 379–423.
Sharov, Alexei A. (1991). “Self-reproducing systems: structure, niche relations and evolution”. In: BioSys-
tems 25, pp. 237–249.
Ulanowicz, Robert E. et al. (2009). “Quantifying sustainability: Resilience, efficiency and the return of
information theory”. In: Ecological Complexity 6, pp. 27–36. doi: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2008.10.005.
Zorach, Alexander C. and Robert E. Ulanowicz (2003). “Quantifying the complexity of flow networks: How
many roles are there?” In: Complexity 8.3, pp. 68–76. issn: 1099-0526. doi: 10.1002/cplx.10075.
6
